Securitization was meant to disperse credit risk to those who were better able to bear it. In practice, securitization appears to have concentrated the risks in the financial intermediary sector itself. This paper outlines an accounting framework for the financial system for assessing the impact of securitization on financial stability. If securitization leads to the lengthening of intermediation chains, then risks becomes concentrated in the intermediary sector with damaging consequences for financial stability. Covered bonds are one form of securitization that do not fall foul of this principle. I discuss the role of countercyclial capital requirements and the Spanishstyle statistical provisioning in mitigating the harmful effects of lengthening intermediation chains.
Introduction
The current financial crisis has the distinction of being the first post-securitization crisis in which banking and capital market developments have been closely intertwined. Historically, banks have always reacted to changes in the external environment, expanding and contracting lending in reaction to shifts in economic conditions. However, in a market-based financial system built on securitization, banking and capital market developments are inseparable, and the current crisis is a live illustration of the potency of the interaction between the two.
Securitization was meant to disperse credit risk to those who were better able to bear it, but in the financial crisis the risks appear to have been concentrated in the financial intermediary sector itself, rather than with the final investors. To understand the true role played by securitization in the financial crisis, we need to dispose of two pieces of received wisdom concerning securitization -one old and one new. The old view, now discredited, emphasized the positive role played by securitization in dispersing credit risk, thereby enhancing the resilience of the financial system to defaults by borrowers.
But having disposed of this old conventional wisdom, the fashion now is to replace it with a new one that emphasizes the chain of unscrupulous operators who passed on bad loans to the greater fool next in the chain. We could dub this new fashionable view the "hot potato" hypothesis, since the bad loan is like a hot potato passed down the chain. The idea is attractively simple, and there is a convenient villain to blame, and so has figured in countless speeches given by central bankers and politicians on the causes of the subprime crisis.
But the new conventional wisdom is just as flawed as the old one. Not only does it fall foul of the fact that securitization worked well for thirty years before the subprime crisis, it fails to distinguish between selling a bad loan down the (2008)) chain and issuing liabilities backed by bad loans. By selling a bad loan, you get rid of the bad loan and it's someone else's problem. In this sense, the hot potato is passed down the chain to the greater fool next in the chain. However, the second action has a different consequence. By issuing liabilities against bad loans, you do not get rid of the bad loan. The hot potato is sitting on your balance sheet or on the books of the special purpose vehicles that you are sponsoring. Thus, far from passing the hot potato down the chain to the greater fool next in the chain, you end up keeping the hot potato. In effect, the large financial intermediaries are the last in the chain. While the investors who buy your securities will end up losing money, the financial intermediaries that have issued the securities are in danger of larger losses. Since the intermediaries are leveraged, they are in danger of having their equity wiped out, as some have found to their cost.
Indeed, Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008) report that of the approximately 1.4 trillion dollar total exposure to subprime mortgages, around half A characteristic feature of financial intermediation based on the US-style securitization system is the long chains financial intermediaries involved in channeling funds from the ultimate creditors to the ultimate borrowers. The difference can be illustrated in figures 1.2 and 1.3. Figure 1 .2, depicts a traditional deposittaking bank that collects deposits and holds mortgage assets against household borrowers. Until around 1990, the bulk of home mortgage assets in the United States were held by savings intitutions and commercial banks (see Adrian and Shin (2008) ).
In recent years, however, the proportion of home mortgages held in government sponsored enterprise (GSE) mortgage pools have become the dominant holders.
The chain of financial intermediation has become correspondingly much longer and more heavily dependent on overall capital market conditions. Figure 1.3 illustrates one possible chain of lending relationships whereby credit flows from the ultimate creditors (household savers) to the ultimate debtors (households who obtain a mortgage to buy a house). In this illustration, the mortgage asset is held in a mortgage pool -a passive firm whose sole role is to hold mortgage The mortgage-backed securities might then be owned by an asset-backed security (ABS) issuer who pools and tranches the MBSs into another layer of claims, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Then, a securities firm (a Wall Street investment bank, say) might hold CDOs on their own books for their yield, but finances such assets by collateralized borrowing through repurchase agreements (repos) with a larger commercial bank. In turn, the commercial bank would fund its lending to the securities firm by issuing short term liabilities, such as financial commercial paper. Money market mutual funds would be natural buyers of such short-term paper, and ultimately the money market fund would complete the circle, since household savers would own shares to these funds.
Of course, the illustration in Figure 1 .3 is a simple example of potentially much more complex and intertwined relationships. For instance, the same security could be used several times in repo lending as the lender turns round and pledges the same security as collateral to another lender (the practice known as "re-hypothecation"). In that case, the chain would be much longer and more involved. Nor does the illustration take account of off-balance sheet vehicles such as structured investment vehicles (SIVs) or ABCP conduits that the commer-cial bank might set up in order to finance the direct holding of CDOs and other asset-backed securities.
What is noticeable from the institutions involved in Figure 1 .3 is that they were precisely those institutions that were at the sharp end of the financial crisis One possible argument might be that securitization enables the disperson of credit risk to those who can best bear losses. We have already commented on the apparent failure of this particular mechanism, but we will return to examine it more closely below. Leaving that to one side, another possible justification for long intermediation chains is that there is an inherent need for maturity transformation in the financial system because ultimate creditors demand short-term claims, and that the process of stringing together long lending relationships make it easier to perform the overall maturity transformation role.
There are well known arguments for the desirability of short-term debt for incentive reasons -in particular in disciplining managers. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) have argued that demand deposits for banking arose naturally as a response by the bank's owners and managers to commit not to engage in actions that dissipate the value of the assets, under pain of triggering a depositor run. Diamond and Rajan (2001) have developed this argument further, and have argued that the coordination problem inherent in a depositor run serves as a commitment device on the part of the depositors not to renegotiate in the face of opportunistic actions by the managers. When the bank has the right quantity of deposits outstanding, any attempt by the banker to extort a rent from depositors will be met by a run, which drives the banker's rents to zero. Foreseeing this, the banker will not attempt to extort rents. In a world of certainty, the bank maximizes the amount of credit it can offer by financing with a rigid and fragile deposit-only capital structure.
However, in both Calomiris and Kahn (1991) Figure 1 .4: Overnight repos, financial commercial paper and M2 (normalized to 1 on 6 July 1994)
repos cannot be easily explained by the demand for short-term liquid claims of retail depositors.
An Accounting Framework
Consider a stylized financial system for the allocation of credit in the economy depicted in Figure 2 .1. The financial system channels savings from the lenders to ultimate borrowers. The ultimate lenders are households, either directly or indirectly through institutions such as pension funds, mutual funds and life insurance companies.
Some credit will be directly provided from the lender to the borrower. The accounting framework presented here is based on the picture of credit flow given in Figure 2 .1, and is drawn from . There are  financial intermediaries standing between the ultimate borrowers and the ultimate creditors.
For convenience, we denote these intermediaries simply as "banks".
Denote by   the claim held by bank  on the ultimate borrowers, such as household mortgages or consumer loans. For our purposes in this paper, it does not matter much whether   is in face values or market values, since the purpose of this paper is to outline the underlying accounting relationships within the financial system. However, in what follows, it is useful to interpret all quantities as being in market values, since the comparative statics take on additional richness due to valuation effects.
1
As well as claims on the ultimate borrowers, the banks hold claims against each other. Denote by   the total value of the liabilities of bank , by   the value of bank 's liabilities held by bank  and by   the share of bank 's liabilities that are held by bank . Denoting by   the value of equity of bank , the balance sheet of bank  is Assets Liabilities
The balance sheet identity of bank  is:
The left hand side is the value of assets and the right hand side is the sum of debt (  ) and equity (  ). The matrix of claims and obligations between banks can then be depicted as below. The ( )th entry in the table is the debt owed by bank  to bank . Then, the th row of the matrix can be summed to give the total value of debt of bank , while the th column of the matrix can be summed to
give the total assets of bank . We can give the index  + 1 to the outside creditor sector (households, pension funds, mutual funds etc.), so that  +1 denotes bank 's liabilities to the outside claimholders. Deposits would be the prime example of a liability that a bank has directly to outside creditors.
From the balance sheet identity (2.2), we can express the vector of debt values across the banks as follows, where Π is the  ×  matrix where the ( )th entry is   .
[
or more succinctly as
Define the leverage of bank  as the ratio of the total value of assets to the value of its equity. Denote leverage by   . That is,
, where Λ is the diagonal matrix whose th diagonal entry is   . Thus
Thus, the profile of total lending by the  banks to the end-user borrowers depends on the interaction of three features of the financial system -the distribution of equity  in the banking system, the profile of leverage Λ and the structure of the financial system given by Π. Total lending to end users is increasing in equity and in leverage, as one would expect. More subtle is the role of the financial system, as given by the matrix Π. Define the vector  as
where
In other words,   is the proportion of bank 's debt held by the outside claimholders -the sector  + 1. Then, total lending to enduser borrowers P    can be obtained by post-multiplying equation (2.6) by  so that
Equation (2.8) is the key balance sheet identity for the financial sector as a whole, where all the claims and obligations between banks have been netted out. The left hand side is the total lending to the end-user borrowers. The second term on the right hand side of (2.8) is the total equity of the banking system, and the first term is the total funding to the banking sector provided by the outside claimholders (note that the second term can be written as
Thus, from equation (2.8) we see the importance of the structure of the financial system for the supply of credit. Ultimately, credit supply to end-users must come either from the equity of the banking system, or the funding provided by non-banks. Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008) uses this framework to calibrate the borrowers (loans to firms and households), but it also has assets that are claims against other banks. On the liabilities side, the bank has obligations to outside creditors (such as retail depositors), but it also has obligations to other banks. Now, consider the aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector as a whole, where the assets are summed across individual banks and the liabilities are summed across the banks, also. Every liability that a bank has to another bank is an asset when viewed from the point of view of the lending bank. One asset cancels out another equal and opposite liability. In aggregate, all the claims and obligations across banks cancel out. Thus, in aggregate, the assets of the banking sector as a whole against other sectors of the economy consists of the lending to non-bank borrowers. This lending must be met by two sources -the total equity of the banking system, and the liabilities that banks have to lenders outside the banking system. The total debt liabilities of the banking sector to the household creditors can be expected to be sticky, and would be related to total household assets. Thus, the expression in the red balloon above will be slow-moving, in line with shifts in the total household holding of debt claims on the banking sector. For the purposes of short-term comparative statics, we could treat it as a constant. If we treat the expression in the red balloon as a constant, we learn much about the impact of various shifts in the parameters on the configuration of the financial system. We now examine two scenarios.
Boom Scenario
Consider a boom scenario where the marked-to-market equity of the banks are healthy (that the profile of equity {  } is strong) and the decline in measured risks leads to an increase in leverage, {  }. In order for the expression in the red balloon to remain constant, there must be an overall decline in {  }, the proportion of funding coming from outside claimholders. In other words, banks must lend more to each other in order to achieve their desired risk-taking profile and leverage, given their strong capital position. In such a scenario, banks take on more of each others' debts and the intertwining of claims and liabilities become more far-reaching. The image is of an increasingly elaborate edifice built on the same narrow foundation, so that the structure becomes more and more precarious.
The systemic risks therefore increase during the boom scenario. Shortening of maturities would be a natural counterpart to the lengthening intermediation chains. In order for each link in the chain to be a profitable leveraged transaction, the funding leg of the transaction must be at a lower interest rate. When the yield curve is upward-sloping, this would entail funding with shorter and shorter maturities at each step in the chain. The prevalence of the overnight repo as the dominant funding choice for securities firms before the current crisis can be understood in this context. The use of ultra-short term debt is part and parcel of long intermediation chains.
The importance of the short-term interest rate in determining the size and fragility of the financial system can be seen from the above line of reasoning. A period of sustained short-term interest rates (with the assurance of continued low short rates by the central bank) is a highly favorable environment for the taking on of such short-term bets. Adrian and Shin (2008) shows that the Fed Funds rate is an important determinant of the growth of securities firms' balance sheets, which in turn has significant effects on the real economy. Thus, there is a monetary policy angle to the increasing length of intermediation chains.
Bust Scenario
Now consider the reversal of the boom scenario whereby perceptions of heightened risk raise Value at Risk and induce deleveraging of the financial system, leading to lower {  }. In addition, falls in asset prices and possible credit losses eat into the marked-to-market equity levels {  }. This is a double whammy for the financial system as a whole, since in order for the expression in the red balloon to stay roughly constant, there has to be substantial increases in {  }. The increase in   means that a greater proportion of the funding comes from outside claimholders -that is, the funding that banks had granted to each other must now be withdrawn. This is a classic run scenario where banks run on other banks. The direct manifestation of a run of this type can be given a simpler depiction in the following two bank example, taken from Morris and Shin (2008) . Bank 1 has borrowed from Bank 2. Bank 2 has other assets, as well as its loans to Bank 1. Suppose that Bank 2 suffers credit losses on these other loans, but that the creditworthiness of Bank 1 remains unchanged. The loss suffered by Bank 2 depletes its equity capital. In the face of such a shock, a prudent course of action by Bank 2 is to reduce its overall exposure, so that its asset book is trimmed to a size that can be carried comfortably with the smaller equity capital.
From the point of view of Bank 2, the imperative is to reduce its overall lending, including its lending to Bank 1. By reducing its lending, Bank 2 achieves its micro-prudential objective of reducing its risk exposure. However, from Bank 1's perspective, the reduction of lending by Bank 2 is a withdrawal of funding.
Unless Bank 1 can find alternative sources of funding, it will have to reduce its own asset holdings, either by curtailing its lending, or by selling marketable assets.
In the case where we have the combination of (i) Bank 1 not having alternative sources of funding, (ii) the reduction in Bank 2's lending being severe, and (iii) Bank 1's assets being so illiquid that they can only be sold at fire sale prices, then 
Prescriptions
The prescriptions for moderating the flucutations associated with the boom and busts scenarios can also be understood in terms of the aggregate balance sheet identity (2.8). We discuss three in particular -regulatory interventions, various forms of forward-looking provisioning, and the reform of the institutions involved in financial intermediation. Leverage caps or countercyclical capital targets aim at restraining the growth of leverage {  } in boom times so that the corresponding bust phase of the financial cycle is less damaging, or can be avoided altogether. In the above expression, moderating the fluctuations in {  } implies that the marked-to-market equity values {  } and the outside financing proportions {  } can also be kept within moderate bounds, so as to prevent the rapid build-up of cross-exposures which are then subsequently unwound in a disorderly way as runs against other banks.
A closely related set of proposals are those that address the composition of assets, rather than the capital ratio. The idea is to impose liquidity requirements on the banks so as to limit the externalities in the bust phase of the cycle. (2004) is an early statement of the proposal, subsequently incorporated in the Bank of England's RAMSI framework for systemic risk. For creditor banks, there are two effects. First, knowing that the debtor bank is less vulnerable to runs reduces the incentive to run that arises purely from a coordination motive. In addition, when each creditor bank realizes that other creditor banks have higher liquidity levels, the coordination problem among the creditor banks becomes less sensitive to strategic risk -making them less jittery when faced with a run scenario. The more relaxed attitude of creditors and debtors are mutually reinforcing, just in the same way that distress and concerns about others' viability can be self-reinforcing. In this way, the same forces that lead to the vicious circle of run psychology can be harnessed and channeled to generate a virtuous circle of stability.
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Approach 2. Forward-Looking Provisioning.
A second way to moderate fluctuations of the boom bust cycle is to operate directly on the equity {  } of the banks. The forward-looking statistical provisioning scheme that has operated in Spain is a good example of such a method.
By imposing a provisioning charge when new loans are made, there is a corresponding diminution of the equity level of the bank making the loan. For any given desired leverage of the bank, a lower equity level means lower total assets, hence restraining the rapid growth of balance sheets. The Spanish pre-provisioning scheme highlights one of the important lessons in a boom 4 . Under a boom scenario, the problem is that there is too much equity in the banking system. There is overcapacity in the sense that the level of aggregate capital is too high. Capital is higher than is consistent with only prudent loans being made. Overcapacity leads to the chasing of yields and the lowering of credit standards. Elsewhere ), I have sketched a mechanism for the emergence of subprime lending based on this mechanism. Expanding balance sheets are like an expanding balloon. Just as an expanding balloon needs air to fill the balloon, expanding balance sheets need new asset creation. But when all prime mortgage borrowers are already catered for, lending standards must be lowered in order to generate new assets. Hence, subprime lending emerges as a result of the urge to expand balance sheets.
In the Geneva Report, we discuss the merits of a variant of the Spanish preprovisioning scheme called the Pigovian Tax. The idea is that rather than reducing equity through a provision, equity can also be lowered in a boom through an explicit centralized tax. The tax has the potential to enhance efficiency of the overall financial system in the same way that a congestion charge would improve traffic in a city. By counteracting an existing inefficiency through a tax, one can counteract the harmful externality. Just as with a traffic congestion charge, the revenue raised in the tax is not an essential component of the scheme. However, if the revenue raised through the Pigovian Tax could be put into a separate bank resolution fund, then the scheme would not imply a net transfer away from the banking sector.
Approach 3. Structural Reform of Intermediation.
A third approach is more long term, and is aimed at influencing the market structure of the financial intermediary sector as a whole. The idea is to restrain the lengthening of intermediation chains, and encourage the formation of shorter intermediation chains. One potential way to induce such shortening of the intermediation chain would be through the encouragement of the issuance of covered bonds -bonds issued against segregated assets on a bank's balance sheet, with recourse against the issuing bank itself.
The intermediation chain associated with a covered bond is short, since the bank holds mortgage claims against ultimate borrowers, and issues covered bonds that could be sold directly to households or to long-only institutions such as mutual funds or pension funds. The bonds offer longer duration that match the duration of the assets. The longer duration of the liabilities have two advantages.
First, the duration matching between assets and liabilities means that the issuing bank does not engage in maturity transformation in funding. Rigorous application of marking to market makes less sense when loans are segregated to back such liabilties. In the Geneva Report, we have argued that the accounting treatment of such assets can take account of what the banks are capable of holding, rather than simply appealing to their intentions, as is the rule under the current markto-market regime .
Second, the fact that liabilities have long duration means that the short-term funding that is prevalent in the long intermediation chains will be less likely to be employed provided that the covered bonds are held directly by households or by long-only institutions such as pension funds and mutual funds. The long duration of such securities would be a natural source of sought-after duration for pension funds who wish to match the long duration of their pension liabilities.
Household savers would also find such products a good substitute for govenment bond funds. The shortening of the intermediation chain in this way will have important benefits in terms of mitigating the fluctuations in leverage and balance sheet size in the financial boom bust cycle. As already discussed, covered bonds are securities issued by a bank and backed by a dedicated, segregated group of loans known as a "cover pool". The bondholders have two safeguards in their holding of covered bonds. First, the bonds are backed by the cover pool over which the bondholders have senior claims in case of bankrupcy. Second, because the covered bonds are the obligations of the issuing bank, the bondholders have recourse to the bank if the cover pool is insufficient to meet the bond obligations. In this second sense, covered bonds differ from the U.S.-style mortgage backed security, which are obligations of the special purpose vehicle -a passive company whose sole purpose is to hold assets and issue liabilities against those assets. The loans backing the covered bonds stay on the balance sheet of the bank, eliminating one step in the intermediation chain, and also guarding against potential incentive problems in the "originate to distribute" model of securitization in which the originating bank can sell the loan and take it off its balance sheet altogether.
The double protection offered by covered bonds distinguishes them both from senior unsecured debt and asset-backed securities (ABSs). In contrast to ABSs, the cover pool serves mainly as credit enhancement and not as a means to obtain exposure to the underlying assets. Also, cover pools tend to be dynamic in the sense that issuers are allowed to replace assets that have either lost some quality or have been repaid early. These features imply that covered bonds are seen not so much as an instrument to obtain exposure to credit risk, but rather as a higher-yielding alternative to government securities. The legislation required to underpin the operation of a covered bond system is more developed in some regions than others. Europe leads the world in this respect. In the European Union, covered bonds are defined by the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), which limits the range of accepted collateral maximum loan-to-value ratios. While the CRD only recognizes securities issued under special legislation as covered bonds, market participants tend to work with a more general definition that also includes bonds issued under private contractual arrangements using elements from structured finance. There have been a number of such "structured covered bonds", primarily in countries without covered bond legislation (eg the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States) (see Packer, Stever and Upper (2007) ).
Indeed, one of the main hurdles against the widespread introduction of a covered bond system has been the legal hurdle of introducing a class of claimholders for the cover pool that are senior to the deposit insurance agency, and hence the general depositors of the bank. The larger is the cover pool for covered bonds, the smaller is the general pool of assets that are accessible to the deposit insurance agency. In the United States, the FDIC has issued a statement on the treatment of covered bonds, limiting the size of covered bonds to 4% of total liabilities after issuance.
5 Given the benefits associated with the shortening of the intermediation chain, there are legitimate questions on how much political will can be mustered in order to amend the relavant laws to allow the operation of the covered bond system.
A possible alternative legal approach would be to permit specialist "narrow" banks whose liabilities are restricted to covered bonds only, and hence whose liabilities are not insured by the deposit insurance agency. Such narrow banks would be akin to Danish mortgage banks whose liabilities match the duration of the assets perfectly and whose equity provides a cushion for bond holders.
Concluding Remarks
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Comm ercial Banks in the current crisis. Figure 4 .2 is the same chart, but in log scale. The greater detail afforded by the chart in log scale reveals that the securities sector kept pace with the rest of the economy until around 1980, but then started a growth spurt that outstripped the other sectors. On the eve of the crisis, the securities sector had grown to around ten times its size relative to the other sectors in the economy. Clearly, such a pace of growth could not go on forever. Even on an optimstic scenario, the growth of the securities sector would have tapered off to a more sustainable pace to keep in step with the rest of the economy.
The relative size of the securities sector can be seen as a mirror of the lengthening intermediation chains in the market-based system of financial intermediation.
One could reasonably conclude that some of the baroque flourishes that appeared in the Indian summer of the expansion of the securities sector (such as the growth of exotic asset-backed securities such as CDO-squared) have gone for good, and are unlikely to feature in a steady state of the securities sector.
Overall, it would be reasonable to speculate that the securities sector that emerges from the current crisis in sustainable form will be smaller, with shorter intermediation chains, perhaps less profitable in aggregate, and with less maturity transformation. The backdrop to this development will be the regulatory checks and balances that are aimed at moderating the fluctuations in leverage and balance sheet size that were instrumental in making the current financial crisis the most severe since the Great Depression.
